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

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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1 Overview

The debate over the semantics of proper names has, of late, heated up, focusing on the relative merits of referentialism and predicativism. Referentialists maintain that the semantic function of proper names is to designate individuals. They hold that a proper name, as it occurs in a sentence in a context of use, refers to a specific individual that is its referent and has just that individual as its semantic content, its contribution to the proposition expressed by the sentence. Furthermore, a proper name contributes its referent to the proposition expressed by virtue of mechanisms of direct reference to individuals, not by virtue of expressing properties. Predicativists embrace an opposing view according to which proper names are just a special kind of common noun. Their semantic function is to designate properties of individuals. A proper name, as it occurs in a sentence in a context of use, expresses a property, and that property is its contribution to the proposition expressed by the sentence. They admit of various types of restrictions—in exactly parallel fashion with other common nouns.

It is reasonably uncontroversial to acknowledge that referentialism at least *seems* the more intuitively compelling theory. Pre-theoretically, proper names appear to be most commonly used simply to directly designate unique individuals. To

I presented material in this paper to the 2011 Gottingen Conference on Proper Names, the 2012 2nd Annual Parma Workshop in Philosophy of Language, the 2012 meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy, the Rutgers-Princeton Philosophy of Language Seminar in October 2012, the Ohio Reference Workshop, the 2013 Pacific APA in San Francisco, the 2013 Conference on Reference and Frege's Puzzles, Umea, Sweden, the 2013 PhLiP Workshop in Tarrytown, and the Leonard Linsky Memorial Conference at the University of Chicago.

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competently use proper names, speakers do not seem to have to grasp their meaning, unlike with common nouns. Syntactic differences can provide additional support: proper names do not seem to interact with determiners in the way that common nouns do, a point underscored by Chomsky who defined proper names as "nouns with no determiner"[1] and regarded them as incompatible with the determiner system. Chomsky recognized that proper names do sometimes occur with determiners, but regarded these as exceptional, and restricted in the sense that, he claimed, proper names may not pick up determiners as freely as common nouns. He also maintained that when proper names do occur with determiners, they are being *used as* common nouns.[2]

The force of these intuitive considerations rests on focusing on, or taking as paradigmatic, the following types of examples involving proper names, what I shall call, following King (2006), *apparently referential examples* (ARE).

[1] Alfred studies in Princeton.
[2] Stella is inside the museum.

Contemporary predicativists have launched an offensive attack on referentialists by calling them out for illegitimately assuming that such constructions are most fundamental, and in particular for regarding alternative constructions as special cases that do not need to be accommodated within a theory of proper names. The first major challenge came in 1969, when Clarence Sloat argued that Chomsky read the data wrong, either overlooking many constructions or simply misconstruing them as restricted cases.[3] At the syntactic level, claimed Sloat, proper names bear striking similarities to common count nouns. Contrary to Chomsky, he argued, proper names *do* take indefinite and definite articles, numerical determiners, and quantifiers. He laid out what I shall refer to as *The Sloat Chart* to reveal what he saw as syntactic parallels between proper names and common count nouns:

[3a] A man stopped by.	[3b] A Smith stopped by.
[4a] *Some man stopped by.	[4b] *Some Smith stopped by.
[5a] S*o*me man stopped by.	[5b] S*o*me Smith stopped by.
[6a] Some men stopped by.	[6b] Some Smiths stopped by.
[7a] S*o*me men stopped by.	[7b] S*o*me Smiths stopped by.
[8a] Men must breathe.	[8b] Smiths must breathe.
[9a] The clever man stopped by.	[9b] The clever Smith stopped by.
[10a] The man who is clever stopped by.	[10b] The Smith who is clever stopped by.
[11a] A clever man stopped by.	[11b] A clever Smith stopped by.
[12a] The men stopped by.	[12b] The Smiths stopped by.
[13a] The man stopped by.	[13b] *The Smith stopped by.
[14a] *Man stopped by.	[14b] Smith stopped by.

[1] Chomsky (1965, 100).

[2] Chomsky (1965, 217), offers as an example "I once read a novel by a different John Smith" and comments that they may be derived from proper names by transformation.

[3] Sloat (1969).

Constructions with the common count noun "man" are mirrored on the right side by analogous constructions with "Smith". "Some" is the "some" used with mass terms and plurals; "S*o*me" is the "some" typically captured by the existential quantifier. In lines [3]–[14], we can see that when the left side is grammatical for the common count noun, the right side is too. When the left side is ungrammatical for the common count noun, as in [4a], the right side is too, as in [4b]. Asymmetries arise, claimed Sloat, only in the penultimate and final lines of the chart. [13a] is fine, with the common noun in the singular taking the definite whereas [13b] reads intuitively as off and is said to be ungrammatical. And whereas proper names in singular unmodified constructions can occur bare, as displayed in [14b], singular unmodified constructions with common count nouns, as in [14a], cannot.

Inspired by Sloat, contemporary predicativists like Ora Matushansky and Delia Graff Fara have extended the range of syntactic parallels.[4] Fara offers examples similar to [15b] involving complex demonstratives, and gives a nice example, [16b], involving a generic construction.

[15a] That man is happy.	[15b] That Smith is happy.
[16a] Bears from the north are scary.	[16b] Sarahs from the north are scary.

While the asymmetries in the last two lines of the Sloat Chart need to be dealt with and explained away, Sloat, Matushansky, Fara and other predicativists[5] as well regard the many striking parallels in the syntax as a rationale to construe proper names as just a special variety of count noun.

In 1973, Tyler Burge picked up on Sloat's insights and took to heart his widening of the relevant data that a semantic theory needs to accommodate.[6] With regard to the constructions that Sloat offered to challenge Chomsky, plus examples like [17] and [18], Burge claimed these are clearly instances in which proper names occur as predicates and are used literally.

[17] Some Alfreds are crazy; some are sane.
[18] Two Stellas are inside the museum.

Call these *apparently predicative examples* (APE). Furthermore, according to Burge, any semanticist treating, say, the singular occurrence of "Alfred" in [1] and the plural occurrence in [17] as "semantically independent of each other" is blind to the obvious fact that in both examples "Alfred" has exactly the same meaning.[7] Burge articulated a semantic analysis according to which proper names are predicates whose meaning is not reducible to that of any other term, and whose meaning is captured by what I call Burge's *Being Named Condition*.

[4] Matushansky (2005, 2006, 2014), Fara (2011, 2014b).

[5] Cf., Elbourne (2005), Sawyer (2010).

[6] Burge (1973).

[7] Burge (1973, 430). Sloat advanced the same line as well, claiming that a proper name, say, "Smith", has a constant meaning *person that we call "Smith"*.

Burge's Being Named Condition (BNC): A proper name is a predicate true of an individual if and only if the individual is given that name in an appropriate way.

Fara offers a very similar condition yet avoids the appeal to Burge's notion of *being given a name in an appropriate way*, replacing it with a notion of *being called*:

Fara's Being Called Condition (BCC): A proper name 'N' is a predicate true of a thing if and only if it is called N.

Fara's BCC captures the meaning of names as a schema. So, for example, instances governing "Alfred" and "Smith" are:

"Alfred" is a predicate that is true of a thing if and only if it is called Alfred.
"Stella" is a predicate that is true of a thing if and only if it is called Stella.
"Smith" is a predicate that is true of a thing if and only if it is called Smith.

All contemporary predicativists advocate *something like* either Burge's BNC or Fara's BNC to capture proper names' meaning.

The BNC/BCC appears to fairly naturally apply to and makes sense of the APEs, but how it is applicable to the syntax and semantics of the proper names in the AREs? After all, in such examples, a particular individual is clearly meant and, intuitively, expressed by the sentence in the context of use. For example, [1] is true just in case a *particular* individual, Alfred, studies in Princeton. There is a certain intended truth-maker, one that the direct reference theorist maintains is encoded in "Alfred". The predicativist's BNC/BCC meaning analysis do not, by themselves, capture this feature of APEs.

Predicativists have offered two analyses. Burge advocated what I call the *Demonstrative Analysis* according to which proper names that occur bare and in the singular have the same syntactic and semantic structure as the phrase "that book".[8] Essentially, the proper name is regarded as fronted by an "invisible" unpronounced demonstrative "that", one that is covert on the surface yet syntactically real. So sentence [1] is regarded as equivalent to [1′], where the square brackets indicate unpronounced material

[1′] [*That*] Alfred studies in Princeton.

The demonstrative element here, when coupled in a context with a demonstration or gesture or even visual attention or contextual salience, functions to explain why AREs are naturally regarded as being about a particular individual.

Sloat advanced an alternative *Definite Analysis* on which names that occur unmodified and in the singular in argument position are to be understood as in fact always fronted by an "invisible" unpronounced definite "the". Here, [1] is regarded as equivalent to

[1″] [*The*] Alfred studies in Princeton,

[8] Burge (1973, 432).

where the definite in brackets is unpronounced but syntactically real. In these occurrences, proper names are not themselves equivalent to definite descriptions. They are instead equivalent to the common count nouns that are contained in definite descriptions. So in [1] "Alfred" functions as a count noun in the same way that the count noun "dog" functions in "The dog resides in Princeton". Unlike the demonstrative analysis, the definite analysis requires supplementation in order to explain why AREs are construed as about particular individuals. A natural move is to treat [1] and examples like it as incomplete definite descriptions, and then draw on resources used by Russellians about definite descriptions to secure uniqueness, namely domain restrictions. The key idea in the explanation of uniqueness is, once again, to keep parallelism with the corresponding explanation for common count nouns. Thus predicativists invoke nominal restrictions to secure uniqueness, just as one can for common count nouns in incomplete descriptions.[9] So my utterance of [1′] would get fleshed out as in [1″]

[1″] [*The*] Alfred [*at the party*] resides in Princeton.

as incorporating an implicit restriction to a particular individual.

Although there are many interesting questions regarding the adequacy of both the demonstrative and definite analyses of proper names in apparently referential examples, I wish to bypass them here.[10] Although some of my discussion cross-cuts both accounts, I shall focus my discussion on the Definite Analysis advocated by Sloat, Elbourne, Matushansky, and Fara because it relies upon syntactic considerations that I call into question in Sect. 7. The key point for us now is simply that with their appeal to covert material realized at the syntactic level, predicativists have advanced promising accounts to explain particularity.

Burge took a crucial further step in the offensive attack on referentialism. Essentially, he converted many of Sloat's insights into a novel yet simple argument in favor of predicativism over referentialism. Burge argued that his semantic theory is unified in the sense that it advances a single meaning-analysis for *all* the cases, AREs and APEs alike. By contrast, he claimed, referentialism is unable to subsume APEs into a unified semantic theory of proper names. Referentialism is therefore, he concluded, 'theoretical flimsy' and uneconomical. This *Uniformity Argument*, as I shall call it, has become *the* primary (though not the sole) rationale for predicativism over referentialism. With increasing weight placed on unified semantic analyses in various domains (demonstratives, indexicals, etc.), the uniformity argument for predicativism about proper names has of late soared in its influence.[11]

I am sympathetic with predicativists' widening the range of data points in our semantic theorizing with their appeal to APEs and their ambitions to offer a unified semantics. I also agree that no theorist may simply disregard the syntactic parallels they advance. All of these demand explanation. However, I am not persuaded by the

[9] Cf., Stanley and Szabo (2000) and Stanley (2002).

[10] There is much more to be said about this issue. Cf., Segal (2001), King (2006), and Rami (2014) for some discussion.

[11] Contemporary proponents of the uniformity argument include Guerts (1997), Elbourne (2005), Sawyer (2010), and Fara (2011).

uniformity argument. And I am not convinced of all the syntactic data on offer. I have three overarching aims in this paper: (i) to clarify and undo the uniformity argument for the superiority of predicativism over referentialism; (ii) to show that our semantic theory already has the resources to explain APEs, but on our account, the expressions are not proper names but common nouns or are proper names being used as common nouns; and (iii) to question one of the key data points advanced by Sloat and contemporary predicativists, that constructions like that in [13b], "The Smith stopped by", are ungrammatical. The positive result for referentialism about proper names is that we can explain the *correct* data in the Sloat Chart while construing APEs as common count nouns.

2 The Uniformity Argument

Predicativists claim that predicativism is theoretically superior to referentialism as a complete semantic theory insofar as it is more *unified*. Burge voices the claim to theoretical superiority thus:

> Our account covers plural and modified occurrences as well as singular, unmodified ones. A constants view not only is more complicated in that it must give a different semantics for these different occurrences … it is also faced with the task of justifying its disunification. Appeal to "special" uses whenever proper names clearly do not play the role of individual constants is flimsy and theoretically deficient.[12]

All predicativists maintain that referentialists will alternately either have an "uneconomical" theory[13] or will need to dub the APEs as somehow "deviant" or "non-literal" occurrences of proper names in order to avoid treating them in a unified fashion.

Throughout the literature, comments like these constitute the predicativist's main argument against referentialism. It would be useful to have an explicit statement. Here's one version[14]:

Predicativists' Uniformity Argument

Premise 1: AREs [1]–[2] and their kin involve occurrences of proper names, used literally.

Premise 2: APEs [17]–[18] and their kin involve occurrences of proper names, used literally.

[12] Burge (1973, 437).

[13] Elbourne (2005, 171).

[14] In Jeshion (2014a), I offered a different version of the uniformity argument. Ultimately, both reveal the same problems with the predicativists' argument, but the version on offer here is more explicit in spelling out how the predicativist's argument rests on the appeal to proper names being used literally, or with their normal meaning, while that in Jeshion (2014a) points toward alternative ways of explaining the available data sets. Elugardo (2002) also offers a detailed explication of a version of the uniformity argument. His differs significantly from mine insofar as it does not emphasize predicativists' claims to having accounted for literal uses and to having exhausted the types of cases requiring explanation. Cf., also Rami (2013) for an account that focuses on Burge's development of the argument.

Premise 3: Occurrences of proper names akin to [1]–[2] and [17]–[18] constitute the only types of occurrences of proper names used literally.
Premise 4: Referentialism cannot offer a uniform semantic analysis of all proper names, used literally.
Premise 5: With the BNC/BCC, predicativism can offer a uniform semantic analysis of all proper names, used literally.
Premise 6: A semantic theory of proper names that offers a unified semantic analysis for all occurrences of proper names when used literally is better than one that does not.
Conclusion: Predicativism is a better semantic theory than Referentialism.

All the premises of the argument invoke an appeal to a notion of literality, so a few words are in order about that. At the inception of the debate, predicativists recognized the need to make a case for thinking that APEs are literal uses of proper names. Burge claims

> …a proper name functioning as a singular term designates an object only if the object is given that name in an appropriate way. […]this suggestion provides an explication for the fact that we talk of the normal or literal use of proper names. Literal use contrasts with metaphorical use. Unlike metaphorical uses ('George Wallace is a Napoleon'), literal uses of proper names – whether or not in singular unmodified form – involve application only to objects that bear them.[15]

Burge's idea is that [19] and examples like it, [20]–[21],

[19] George Wallace is a Napoleon.
[20] Who is the next Einstein?
[21] She's a little Mia Hamm.

are obviously metaphorical and so, he concluded, instances of non-literal applications of names. Let's call these *Metaphorical Examples*. *Metaphorical Examples* are, Burge argued, plainly different in kind from APEs and thus they help underwrite the claim that APEs *are* literal uses of proper names.

In the other direction, predicativists also recognized the need to cordon off as unproblematic examples of uses of proper names as predicates that the BCC/BNC does not naturally accommodate. *Metaphorical Examples* serve here as well. As Burge and other predicativists have noted, at least on their intended metaphorical readings, the BNC/BCC do not offer the correct truth conditions for [19]–[21]. [19] does not express that a person who is named "George Wallace" is a person who has the name "Napoleon". However, they claim, insofar as those uses of proper names are metaphorical, they are not problematic for the predicativist because non-literal uses need not be explained within the meaning analysis. Since referentialists typically agree with predicativists that all and only literal uses of proper names need to be accommodated within the semantic theory's meaning analysis, predicativists' appeal to *Metaphorical Examples* aims to legitimate their grouping together AREs

[15] Burge (1973, 434).

with the APEs as *the* (the *only*) types of cases that the meaning analysis ought to cover.

Let's return now to the uniformity argument. Premise 1 is uncontroversial, for referentialists and predicativists both regard examples like [1] and [2] as involving literal uses of proper names, with each offering their own semantic explanations to account for them. Predicativists support Premise 2 first, perhaps, on intuitive grounds, but bolster it by the contrast with *Metaphorical Examples*. Premise 3 is never explicitly stated, but is needed; otherwise the claim (stated in Premise 5) that the BNC/BCC can provide a unified semantics is unsupported. Here again, predicativists gesture at *Metaphorical Examples* as a recognition of instances of uses of proper names that resist explanation by BNC/BCC, with the idea that they will all be somehow non-literal uses. The support for Premise 4 is just that referentialism cannot advance a constants view for APEs, whereas the support for Premise 5 is that the BNC/BCC do suffice as a unified semantic analysis for the apparently referential and apparently predicative examples.

Premise 6 should not be misunderstood as merely expressing the theoretical virtues of unification, of a single semantics of proper names. To have bite in this debate, unification needs to be the decisive factor in selection of the best semantic analysis. In my view, Premise 6 is misguided. We should not regard uniformity—or indeed *any* single factor—as a decisive dimension along which to evaluate a semantic theory. But we can bracket this matter, for everyone agrees that greater uniformity is desirable. So if predicativism can explain all literal uses of a proper name with a single meaning analysis, and referentialism cannot, that *does* count as a significant (albeit non-decisive) advantage over referentialism. Replacing premise 6 with premise 6′ and carrying it through to the conclusion gives the more plausible argument:

> Premise 6′: A semantic theory of proper names that offers a unified semantic analysis for all occurrences of proper names when used literally has significant theoretical advantages over one that does not.
> Conclusion′: Predicativism has significant theoretical advantages over Referentialism.

3 Widening the Data

We have thus far considered three main types of examples, AREs, APEs, and *Metaphorical Examples*. There are various additional types of examples that, pre-theoretically and intuitively, are candidates for being considered predicative occurrences of proper names and that are not easily cordoned off as special uses, unlike the *Metaphorical Examples*. I shall survey a series of such examples momentarily. In the common spirit of valuing unification and valuing a semantic theory's capacity to explain wide and divergent varieties of examples, all should agree that any theory of proper names must provide some explanation of these cases. Because, as we'll see, the BNC/BCC do not supply the right truth conditions, the predicativist will need to explain these examples away as either non-literal uses

of proper names or as literal uses of expressions that are not proper names or as otherwise not genuine examples within the range of what needs to be explained. Dialectically, in relation to the uniformity argument, the challenge will be for the predicativist to demonstrate that APEs should not as well be explained along the same lines. That is, in order to simultaneously advance premises two and three, the predicativist will need a rationale for why APEs are not analogous to any of the types of examples on offer.

The first type of examples involves proper names being used to designate objects that have been produced or designed by a certain individual. Consider again sentence [18],

[18] Two Stellas are inside the museum.

which was earlier used as a canonical instance of an APE. If what is meant by [18] is that there are two paintings by the artist Frank Stella inside the museum, the truth turns on whether there are two artworks created by him, not on whether there are two individuals named "Stella" in the museum. Consider as well:

[22] Every Puccini has been performed this year.
[23] The Picassos are in the east wing; the Kollwitzs are in the west wing.

On our intended interpretation, the truth of [22] depends upon whether every opera by Giacomo Puccini has been performed this year, while the truth of [23] turns upon the locations of certain artwork by Pablo Picasso and Kathe Kollwitz. The derivation pattern is fairly productive. A young ambitious designer may say of her most recent chair design

[24] The latest Hanson will be a hit.

Similarly, a proud parent might gush

[25] Let's put the green Wilson on the refrigerator and the pink one on the wall.

Call these *Producer Examples*.

Another set of examples involves proper names used to designate individuals fashioned as replicas, copies, models, or some other variety of representation of some individual. Consider an utterance of

[26] Two Obamas came to the Halloween party.

intended to convey that two individuals dressed as Barack Obama came to the Halloween party, and [27], uttered at Madame Tussauds,

[27] The Hepburn is amazing, but the Cher is weak.

to means that the wax representation of Audrey Hepburn is amazing while that of Cher is weak. Here again, this class of examples is fairly productive. Call these and like cases *Representational Examples*.

Another set of examples involves proper names that are used to flag resemblance along a certain contextually salient dimension. If Lena arrives with her two daughters that physically resemble her, one can say truly

[28] Two little Lenas just arrived.

Here the proper name is applied to those and only those who closely resemble Lena in some contextually salient way. Or consider

[29] I wish I had a whole classroom full of Adrians.

These cases obviously possess strong structural parallels to our *Metaphorical Examples*. The truth of [19] depends on whether George Wallace has properties that are similar to the contextually relevant salient properties of Napoleon. Examples [28] and [29] appear to have the same standing as [19]–[21], with the latter just being examples in which the name is a name of a famous person. Call these *Resemblance Examples*.

The last type of examples include dynasty and blood names,[16] like "Romanov", "Tudor" and family names like "Kennedy", all of which are used to apply to members of a certain family, where membership is typically determined through kinship and marital relations. The examples are plainly not straightaway instances of APEs as is shown by the fact that being called, say, "Romanov" is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a Romanov, in the sense of being a member of the dynastic family. Drawing on examples due to Boër, suppose Joe Romanov, while named "Romanov", is not a member of the Romanov dynastic family. [30], on its intended interpretation,

[30] Joe Romanov is not a Romanov.

expresses this fact and is true. In the other direction, supposing it is discovered through genealogical records that Walter Cox is a member of the Romanov dynasty, then

[31] Walter Cox is a Romanov.

is true, though Cox himself has never been named or called "Romanov". Similarly, Maria Shriver is a Kennedy because she belongs to the Kennedy family, but is not named or called "Kennedy". The set of examples does not, however, depend on the existence of individuals who lack the name yet belong to the family and vice versa. The examples only depend on the fact that it is one thing for an expression to, say, apply to members of the Kennedy family of political fame, and another for it to apply to individuals that are named "Kennedy". Let's dub these *Family Examples*.

[16] Examples of this kind were first offered by Boër in his critical piece on Burge, Boër (1975). Boër maintained that predicativists need to explain them with the BNC/BCC, as does Elugardo (2002). I regard these cases as having a different dialectical role. Predicativists need a motivation for treating APEs differently from *Family Examples*, and indeed from our other types of examples.

Like our other examples, these naturally generalize. When [32] functions as a *Family Example*,

[32] Two Smiths will be at the wedding.

"Smith" applies to all and only members of a certain family, not individuals who are named "Smith". Other *Family Examples* include:

[33] Mahatma Gandhi is not a Nehru-Gandhi.
[34] The Robinsons are coming to dinner.
[35] The Corleones are more dangerous than the Molinaris.

There are other types of examples that could be explored (and we shall come to some shortly), but *Producer*, *Representational*, *Resemblance*, and *Family Examples* will serve for now.

With the new types of examples on the table, we can offer more details about their role within the dialectic. First and more obviously, as noted earlier, these examples need to be explained. Second, the examples help illustrate that *from the sentence alone*, one cannot automatically "read off" the predicativist's favored interpretation, what I shall henceforth call the *BCC-friendly interpretation,* as the meaning of the sentence. (When examples are given with this as the intended interpretation, I speak of them as *BCC-friendly Examples*.) We saw earlier that a single sentence like

[18] Two Stellas are inside the museum.

that is typically presented to make the case for predicativism can have various interpretations. One is the *BCC-friendly* interpretation, true if and only if two individuals who are named "Stella" are inside of the museum. Another is an interpretation as a *Producer Example*, true if and only if two artworks by [Frank] Stella are inside of the museum. We can multiply interpretations here to generate various *Representational Examples*, true if and only if two sculptures of [Frank] Stella are inside of the museum or two persons dressed as [Frank] Stella are inside of the museum, as well as *Family Examples*, true if and only if two members of the (contextually selected) Stella family are inside of the museum. We can easily proliferate alternative interpretations for all the sentences presented as APEs.

For the third point, recall premises two and three of the uniformity argument. Premise two states that APEs and their kin are occurrences of proper names used literally. Premise three states that AREs and APEs constitute the only types of occurrences of proper names used literally. Recall also that to support both premises, the predicativist appealed to *Metaphorical Examples* as non-literal uses of proper names. Their basic idea (as we can now put it) was that the *BCC-friendly* interpretation of the sentences flagged as APEs exemplifies the literal use of the proper name as used as a predicate, something made apparent by contrasting it with the *Metaphorical Examples*. We have just seen a large range of cases that are not, or are not obviously or easily written off as metaphorical or otherwise non-literal uses. Moreover, they suggest the possibility that the *BCC-friendly Examples* are not a

distinguished class, but are rather to be best explained by derivation patterns that parallel those in other types of examples. So my third point is this: our four new types of examples call into question the predicativist's premises two and three, *taken jointly*. In saying that they call these into question, I mean this. First a negative point: The examples do not by themselves directly demonstrate or even serve to show that the *BCC-friendly* interpretations do not constitute occurrences of proper names used literally. However, they do call into question premises two and three, taken together, because insofar as the BNC/BCC meaning analysis does not capture the intended understanding of the examples, the predicativist will need to explain them as either non-literal or not proper names or otherwise as not genuine examples that are within the range of what needs to be explained by a semantic analysis of proper names. And, here's the rub, whatever grounds the predicativist offers for classifying these examples as either non-literal or not proper names or as not genuine examples must be applied back to the *BCC-friendly Examples*. That is, if the predicativist offers a rationale for maintaining that some of our example-types are non-literal, it must be the case that by that rationale, the *BCC-friendly Examples* come out as literal. If the predicativist offers a rationale for maintaining that some of our example-types are not proper names, it must be the case that by that rationale, the *BCC-friendly Examples* come out as proper names. Similarly, if, in lieu of giving a rationale for considering some examples to be non-literal, the predicativist instead aims to explain the examples by exhibiting their derivation patterns, the various semantic or pragmatic mechanisms that generate them, then it must be the case that the *BCC-friendly Examples* cannot be analogously explained by those derivation patterns. It is in this sense that I say that our series of examples jointly call into question premises two and three of the uniformity argument. As Matushansky herself notes, it is "incumbent upon the predicational approach to proper names to demonstrate that [*BCC-friendly Examples*]…are crucially different" from our other examples.[17]

4 Predicativist Analysis of Producer, Representational, and Resemblance Examples

One natural way to try to meet this challenge is to divide the examples into two basic kinds, those that appear to involve some variety of logical polysemy rooted on various derivation patterns, as in the *Producer, Representation,* and *Resemblance Examples,* and hence in *some* sense non-literal uses of proper names, while regarding the *Family Examples* as literal uses of expressions that appear to be, but

[17] Matushansky (2014, 14). Oddly, Fara (2014b, 47) summarizes my point as the claim that the predicativist "cherry-picks" *BCC-friendly Examples* by discounting *Producer*, *Representational*, *Resemblance*, and *Family Examples* and that therefore "predicativists cannot claim to genuinely have concerns for uniformity". This is a nontrivial misunderstanding.

are not in fact, singular proper names at all. Fara and Matushansky have suggested views very similar to this.[18]

Let's consider an analysis due to Fara of *Producer, Representation,* and *Resemblance Examples* as instances of deferred interpretation, occasions when an expression is "used to refer to something that isn't explicitly included in the conventional denotation of that expression".[19] While the term is often used in different ways, I shall follow Nunberg by using "deferred interpretation" broadly to cover cases that may involve meaning transfer, reference transfer, as well as coercion. In his famous 'ham-sandwich' example, a waiter at a restaurant remarks

[36] The ham sandwich is at the table in the corner.

He does so not to express that there's a ham sandwich at the corner table, but rather that the customer who ordered a ham sandwich is at the corner able. The common noun "ham sandwich" is being used *non-standardly*, with a special meaning, as if it applies to those who order ham sandwiches, not to the ham sandwiches themselves. The meaning of 'ham sandwich" can naturally be explained as an instance of deferred interpretation because in the restaurant context, there is a specific salient functional relation from customers to their order. Fara's idea is that a use of a proper name may count as an instance of deferred interpretation if there is "some one specific 'salient functional relation' between the deferred usage of the expression" and its "normal usage"[20] and so a *Representation Example* like

[26] Two Obamas came to the Halloween party.

is an instance of deferred interpretation because there is a specific salient relation mapping individuals to what they are dressed as. Likewise, in *Producer Examples* (also discussed by Nunberg)

[22] Every Puccini has been performed this year.

there is a salient relation mapping productions of various sorts to their creators. And in *Resemblance Examples* like

[28] Two little Lenas just arrived.

the context makes salient the similarity in personal appearance, and so a deferred interpretation of 'Lenas' occurs mapping those who closely resemble an individual (in the contextually salient way) to the individual herself.

[18] Fara (2014a). Fara actually treats *Producer Examples* and *Representational Examples* as instances of deferred interpretation, and regards the *Resemblance Examples* as a separate class unto themselves. I do not find this additional level of categorization useful, since the *Resemblance Examples* are rather naturally construed as on a par with the others. Cf., Jeshion (2014b) for further discussion. In any event, I believe that this more complex classification is inessential to her overall perspective so I simplify here and present it my way. Cf., Matushansky (2014) for additional discussion of these types of examples.

[19] Nunberg (2004, 344).

[20] Fara (2014a).

Of course, to construe these examples as instances of deferred interpretation is not to offer up an analysis of how we should treat them within an overarching semantic and pragmatic theory. As is well known, instances of deferred interpretation can alternately be explained semantically and pragmatically. So, for example, on a pragmatic analysis of Nunberg's [36], "ham sandwich" retains its ordinary, literal, meaning, applying to certain types of sandwiches, but, in the context, the waiter uses it to apply to customers who order ham sandwiches. On a semantic analysis, "ham sandwich" could secure a context-induced shift in its meaning from the ordinary meaning, applying to certain kinds of sandwiches, to that of the deferred interpretation, applying to customers who have ordered that kind of sandwich. Alternately, in the context, "ham sandwich" could simply be regarded as a new term applying to customers who order ham sandwiches, one that is distinct from the phonologically identical term that applies to ham sandwiches themselves. A further semantic analysis would treat "ham sandwich" as elliptical for "customer who orders a ham sandwich". These are all possible accounts for spelling out the mechanisms of deferred interpretation. Fara does not (and does not need to) commit to any one of them because her claim is just that the deferred interpretation is *somehow* generated in the context (pragmatically or semantically) from the normal meaning of the proper name as given by BNC/BCC.

How, according to the predicativist, does this explanation of *Producer*, *Representation*, and *Resemblance Examples* as instances of deferred interpretation combat our concern about premises [2] and [3] taken together, i.e., about the claim that AREs and APEs and their kin are canonical instances of proper names used literally and the only such instances? The answer, presumably,[21] is that there are examples of deferred interpretation for common count nouns that are *exact parallels* to the examples of deferred interpretation of proper names. The former fails to threaten the normal application conditions of common count nouns and exhibit that the deferred interpretation cases are non-standard. Indeed, such examples actually serve to underscore the normal application conditions of common count nouns for they are what the deferred interpretation is derived *from*. Because, it is said, these are exact parallels, the explanation of the proper names examples in terms of deferred interpretation equally serve to show that the meaning from which the deferred interpretation is derived is the normal meaning of proper names and thus that AREs and APEs and their kin are canonical instances of proper names used literally and the only such instances.

As a common count noun example that exactly parallels our *Producer Examples*, Fara offers

[37] Put the gorillas in the east wing and the humans in the west wing.

which is assumed to be spoken by the curator of the Primate Art Museum to tell her assistant where to hang the paintings created alternately by the primates or humans. Here, claims Fara, "we have the same "functional relation"…as we do in the 'Stella' case: a function from artworks to their creators." (2014a, 9) She also offers the pairs

[21] Fara (2014a) advocates the appeal to parallels with common count nouns to establish that the *Producer*, *Representation*, and *Resemblance* examples do not call into question the predicativist semantic analysis of APEs.

[38] There are two Kollwitzes inside the museum.
[39] There are two dragonfruits inside the museum.

which provide *Representation Examples* when used to mean that there are in the museum two portraits of Kollwitz and two still lifes of dragonfruits, respectively. Similarly, [40] provides a common noun *Resemblance Example* that is said to parallel [28]

[28] Two little Lenas just arrived.
[40] Two frisky little puppies just arrived.

when it is used to announce the arrival of two children who behave like frisky little puppies.[22]

Now, I am sympathetic to understanding our proper name *Producer*, *Representation*, and *Resemblance Examples* as instances of deferred interpretation. What I question is Fara's claim that these common noun examples are exactly in parallel to our examples. And this is crucial because it is not enough to appeal to cases of deferred interpretation with common count nouns. We need as well to discern whether the *derivation pattern* for the deferred interpretation in common count noun cases is exactly in parallel with that in the proper name cases because the meaning from which the deferred meaning is derived is the normal meaning of the expression and this is exactly what is at issue concerning proper names: whether both AREs *and* APEs are canonical instances of proper names used literally.

The derivation patterns in the foregoing common count noun and proper name examples are importantly different. On the predicativist analysis of *Producer*, *Representation*, and *Resemblance Examples*, the deferred interpretation is secured only after the meaning of the proper name is contextually restricted to a particular individual, while the deferred interpretation involving common nouns is not. Alternatively put, with proper names, the deferred interpretation is derived from the name as it occurs in AREs. An example of the literal use of "Picasso" from which the deferred interpretation of

[41] Many Picassos are whimsical.

is based is a bare singular occurrence of the name, as in

[42] Picasso was incredibly prolific.

which the predicativist construes as

[43] [*The*] Picasso [*famous twentieth century artist*] was incredibly prolific.

Yet with common count nouns, by contrast, the deferred interpretation is secured, in effect, directly off the meaning of the common count noun itself. The difference becomes apparent when we make completely explicit the function in

[22] Fara (2014a) offers examples similar to [40].

the deferred interpretations of the common count noun/proper name pairs that Fara offers. The contexts for most of these examples were given earlier or are self-explanatory. For [46] and [47], we imagine they are spoken in the gift-shop of the Music Museum.

Producer Examples

[37] Put the gorillas in the east wing and the humans in the west wing.
→Function from paintings to the (type of) primate that created them.
[23] The Picassos are in the east wing, the Kollwitzs in the west wing.
→Function from artworks to their creator.

Representational Examples

[44] There were two robots and a unicorn at the Halloween party.
→Function from persons to the (kinds of) things they came dressed as.
[45] There were two Obamas and a Voldomort at the Halloween party.
→Function from persons to the person/character they came dressed as.
[46] Should we buy a cello or a saxophone?
→ Function from tchotchkes to the (type of) instrument they represent.
[47] Should we buy a Bach or a Beethoven?
→ Function from tchotchkes to the person they represent.

Resemblance Examples

[40] Two frisky little puppies just arrived.
→Function from those who resemble puppies (in the contextually salient way) to puppies.
[28] Two little Lenas just arrived.
→ Function from those who resemble an individual (in the contextually salient way) to the individual herself.

All the common count noun examples involve functions to *types of things* whereas all the proper name examples involve functions to *particular individuals*. This underscores the point above that the deferred interpretations in the proper name cases are derived from bare singular occurrences of proper names—AREs alone, whereas those for common count nouns are derived from the ordinary meaning of the noun.

From the perspective of the predicativist, there are in fact exactly parallel common noun examples to our proper name cases. These involve a deferred interpretation secured only after a contextual restriction on the common count noun. If a certain gorilla exhibits special artistic talent, we can say of him

[48] The gorilla [*in the cage over there*] is a fine artist.

[48] makes explicit the contextual restriction required for a Russellian treatment of the incomplete descriptions. To speak exclusively about *his* paintings, we may say

[49] Hang the gorillas on that wall.

[50] Some gorillas are quite valuable.
[51] A gorilla is on show at the art museum.
→Function from artworks to their creator

It is precisely *these* sorts of cases that are, by predicativists' own strictures (especially those favoring the *Definites Analysis* of AREs), the relevant parallel to our examples with proper names. Now, I do not maintain that it is *impossible* to generate interpretations of these sentences on which they are about paintings by that particular gorilla. However, as Karen Lewis has noted, "the natural interpretation is that each piece of art was done by some gorilla or other, not one gorilla."[23] While contextual supplementation could provide the intended interpretation about the paintings of an individual gorilla, it is *not nearly* as readily available as on our proper name examples. The difference in availability should be explained be the predicativist.

I have detailed what are from the predicativist's own position the common noun counterparts to our *Producer*, *Representation*, and *Resemblance Examples*. Are there counterparts to the common count noun examples of deferred interpretation offered by Fara, examples [37], [39], [40]? In [37], the deferred interpretation is derived from the ordinary *unrestricted* common noun application condition of "gorilla" as used in, say, [52]

[52] Some gorillas and some humans live more than fifty years.
[37] Put the gorillas in the east wing and the humans in the west wing.

The relevant *Producer Example* counterpart to [37] would therefore be derived from ordinary *unrestricted* proper noun application conditions *as given by the predicativist*, as in

[53] Some Smiths and some Andersons live more than fifty years.

and so we have, as a counterpart *Producer Example*,

[54] Put the Smiths in the east wing and the Andersons in the west wing

which we can imagine is spoken by a curator with a (strange) interest in categorizing paintings based on their creators' name.

Where does this leave us with respect to our challenge to the uniformity argument? We've seen that the derivation patterns in the proper names deferred interpretation examples are generated off of uses of names as they occur in AREs, and that the predicative meaning analysis, posited to explain APEs, is here superfluous. Now, the important point with respect to the uniformity argument—to whether APEs should be regarded as having the same meaning as AREs and as being literal uses of proper names—is whether there is an alternative explanation of APEs that is symmetric to the model advanced to explain deferred interpretation of our *Producer, Representation, and Resemblance Examples*. I shall argue that there is: the APEs can be explained exactly symmetrically as instances of deferred

[23] Lewis offered this point in her comments on an ancestor of this paper at the Pacific APA, 2013.

interpretation derived from referential expressions, but these referential expressions do not refer to individuals like Pablo Picasso, Frank Stella, and whatever person, Alfred, is being designated in [1], but rather to what Kaplan calls generic names.

Recall Kaplan's distinction between *common currency names* and *generic names*.[24] Common currency names are given to individuals and are individuated by their naming event. A common currency name is given to an individual A at a certain time by an act of baptism, and is individuated as a distinct common currency name by that very act of baptism. Those that call A by name use A's common currency name with the intention to tap into the convention that was established with that act of baptism. Generic names, by contrast, are not themselves given to individuals at all. Indeed, they should not be construed as names of anyone at all. They function rather as templates for generating common currency names, and so it is generic names that are the subject matter of baby-name books. I will represent which I am speaking about by using the subscripts 'C' for common currency names and 'G' for generic names. On this analysis, two persons A and B will necessarily have different common currency names. Suppose that A's common currency name is "Alfred$_C$" and B's common currency name is "Alfred$_C$". Then, their common currency names, while pronounced and written the same way, are nevertheless different common currency names because they were introduced by different events of baptism and given to different individuals. But, we can say, A and B share a *generic* name, which is also pronounced and written the same way as their common currency names, in the sense that their common currency names were formed from "Alfred$_G$" as if by a template.[25]

We can now re-characterize the deferred interpretation in [18] in terms of the distinction between common currency names and generic names. When

[18] Two Stellas are inside the museum.

is used as a *Producer Example* to mean that there are two paintings by the artist Frank Stella, it is more accurately characterized by

[18C] Two Stellas$_C$ are inside of the museum.

for the term from which the deferred interpretation is derived is the artist's common currency name. An illustration of the non-deferred use of the term from which [18C]'s deferred use as an *Producer Example* is generated, is

[55C] Stella$_C$ is often considered a Modernist.

Now, when [18] is used as a *BCC-friendly Example*, the speaker means that two individuals having (distinct) common currency names formed from the same generic name are inside the museum. Thus, a more accurate rendering of the sentence that is uttered in such a context is

[24] Cf., Kaplan (1990). Cf., Sainsbury [ms] characterizes generic names as serving as templates for common currency names.

[25] Cf., Rami (2014) for several interesting objections to Kaplan's distinction between common currency and generic names.

[18G] Two $\text{Stellas}_{\text{G}}$ are inside the museum.

[18G] gets its deferred interpretation because in the relevant context, there is a salient relation mapping individuals with common currency names formed from a common generic name to the generic name itself. An illustration of a non-deferred use from which this deferred use is derived is

[56G] Stella_{G} is quite popular these days [with expectant parents].

Instead of an explicit appeal to generic names, one might alternatively choose to render [18] in its *BCC-friendly* use as

[18′] Two "Stella"s are inside the museum.

with

[56′] "Stella" is quite popular these days [with expectant parents].

as an instance of the literal use, where '"Stella"' refers to an orthographic or phonological kind. Here, the relevant salient function takes individuals having a name with certain orthographic or phonological properties to that orthographic or phonological kind. While I believe little hangs on choosing one alternative over the other (they may be rough notational variants[26]), the latter rendering exhibits that our analysis is a certain variety of metalinguistic deferred interpretation.[27]

There is nothing ad hoc about this explanation as is apparent from the fact that there are many other instances of such metalinguistic deferred interpretation. Here are examples of the same variety, call them *Metalinguistic Examples*, followed by examples of the non-deferred use of the term on which its corresponding deferred use is based, followed by the function:

[57] Four "awesome"s is more than enough in one blog-post.

[26] The extent to which they are depends upon their respective individuation conditions. Although I have suggested phonological and orthographic properties to individuate names, historical and social properties are also fundamental, and it remains most unclear how to give necessary and sufficient conditions. "Limoncello" is an Italian surname but, evidently, many Italian-Americans belonging to the Limoncello family spell their name "Lemongello", and pronounce it differently as well. Do the Italians and Italian-Americans have the same surname? If a jello enthusiast with spelling challenges gave herself a new surname in honor of her favorite dessert—"Lemongello"—would it be the same surname as the Italian-Americans? Do Robyn Carston and I have the same first name? I am inclined to think that the answer depends upon the context. In some contexts, perhaps those involving tracing ancestral lines, the historical properties are fundamental. In others, the orthographic properties are fundamental, as in John Green's *An Abundance of Katherines*, from which this telling passage is extracted: "When it comes to girls (and in Colin's case, it so often did), everyone has a type. Colin Singleton's type was not physical but linguistic: he liked Katherines. And not Katies or Kats or Kitties or Cathys or Rynns or Trinas or Kays or Kates or, God forbid, Catherines. K-A-T-H-E-R-I–N-E." Green (2006, 15) Thanks to Yael Jeshion-Nelson, John Green lover, for getting me onto this novel.

[27] In Jeshion (2014a), I offered a rough but general rule indicating how to explain the *BCC-friendly Examples* analogously to *Producer, Representation, Resemblance, and Metaphoric Examples*, namely by going metalinguistic. Leckie (2013) offers a similar metalinguistic approach to the derivation. However, for reasons given in Sect. 6, I do not adopt her Polysemy View.

[58] "Awesome" is quite popular these days [with almost everyone].
→function from occurrences of a word to the word itself.
[59] Parental advisory: *The Godfather* has bare breasts, a lot of "damn"s, and at least two "bastard"s.
[60] Did you find entries for "damn" and "bastard" in that dictionary?
→function from utterances of a word to the word itself.

As with our *BCC-friendly Examples*, these are frequently written unaccompanied by quotation marks, and, also like them, these are highly productive, involving common functions from utterances or occurrences of a word to the word itself. But there are, additionally, highly context-sensitive *Metalinguistic Examples*. Consider Kaplan doing a seminar on the semantics of "ouch" and "oops". Tallying up his lot of term papers, he says

[61] I have four "ouch"s and three "oops"s.
→function from seminar papers to the word they are about

to mean that he received four *papers* about "ouch" and three *papers* about "oops". An example of the non-deferred use of the term from which this is based is:

[62] "Ouch" and "oops" are fascinating expressions.

For an exactly symmetrical *non-meta-linguistic* example, consider your teaching assistant saying

[63] I have twenty Benthams and seventeen Kants.
→function from seminar papers to the philosopher they are about

to mean that he received twenty papers about Bentham and seventeen papers about Kant, securing the deferred interpretation from non-deferred-uses, as in

[64] Bentham and Kant are fascinating philosophers.

Let me review our results and their dialectical importance. I maintain that both accounts offered here, summarized below, are promising analyses of the predicativist's *BCC-friendly Examples* of [18] as instances of deferred interpretation.

[18G] Two Stella_{G} are inside the museum.
→Function from individuals having a common currency name formed from a common generic name to the generic name itself.
[18′] Two "Stella"s are inside the museum.
→Function from individuals whose names have certain orthographic or phonological properties to a certain orthographic or phonological kind.

On the proposed analyses, the terms at issue—"Stella_{G}" and "Stella"—are in fact not really proper names, or not the relevant sort of proper names, at all. ("Stella_{G}" applies to a generic name, which is not a name; and "Stella", while often construed as the name of a word, is at least not the sort of name that the predicativist is focused

on.) However, this fact presents no problem for our argument; indeed, it only increases the pressure on the predicativist because now there are two potential reasons why premises two and three of the predicativist's uniformity argument are defective. The predicativist claims that their favored examples are occurrences of proper names, used literally. On our analyses here, they are not occurrences of proper names. And they are at least potentially not being used literally insofar as they are instances of deferred interpretation. Whether they are in fact to be regarded as *non-literal* uses will depend upon the particular linguistic analysis chosen to explain the deferred interpretation—whether it is pragmatic or one of the three semantic analyses, a semantic shift, a predicate replacement, or an ellipsis. Yet whichever analysis is offered, a problem remains with premises two and three, taken together. For whichever linguistic analysis the predicativist advances to explain the *Representation*, *Resemblance*, and *Producer Examples* will be available with respect to the *BCC-friendly Examples*. If the linguistic analysis of the deferred interpretation is explained pragmatically or as a semantic shift or as predicate replacement, these all require that there be a normal meaning from which the deferred interpretation of the proper name is derived. A symmetric linguistic analysis of the *BCC-friendly Examples* would thereby require the same. Yet the predicativist maintains that the BNC/BCC *itself* gives the normal meaning. If the linguistic analysis of the deferred interpretation is explained as an ellipsis, then so too will the *BCC-friendly Examples*. If "Stella" in [18] used as a *Producer Example* is explained as elliptical for "artwork produced by [Frank] Stella", then as a *BCC-friendly Example*, it will be explained, say, as elliptical for "individual who has a common name formed from Stella_{G}" which will undermine the predicativist's premise two.

5 Referentialist Analysis of Producer, Representation, Resemblance, and BCC-friendly Examples

Thus far, I have refrained from advancing my own proposal for analyzing the *BCC-friendly Examples*. I have only said that they *can* be explained as instances of deferred interpretation involving the same derivation patterns as in our Producer, Representation, and Resemblance examples, and that this, in itself, presents difficulties for the predicativist. I'll now argue that there are many reasons to retain referentialism and adopt a metalinguistic deferred interpretation analysis of *BCC-friendly Examples.* Note that while I regard this as *one* explanation of *BCC-friendly Examples*, I shall also argue in the following section that there is another explanation of them as common count nouns, and, indeed, that these two explanations are complimentary.

Many *BCC-friendly Examples* are naturally explained as instances of deferred interpretation involving derivation patterns symmetric with those in our *Producer, Representation*, *Resemblance* and *Metalinguistic Examples*. Assuming that these examples are to be explained as deferred interpretation accounted for *semantically*, they involve contextual coercion of expressions yielding semantic type shifts. When [18] is meant as a *Producer Example*, about two artworks of Frank Stella, we have a mapping from the singular term "Stella", which is type e, onto the predicate

"artwork by Stella", which is type <e, t>. When [18] is meant as a *BCC-friendly Example*, as rendered in [18G], we have a mapping from the singular term "Stella_G", type e, onto the predicate "individual with a common currency name formed from Stella_G", type <e,t>. When [57] is used to speak about the overuse of "awesome", it is explained as involving a mapping from the singular term "awesome", type e, to "occurrence of "awesome"", type <e,t>. The derivation pattern is the same: all three take singular terms—proper name, an expression for a generic name, and what many regard as a name of a word—to a predicate.

This account offers numerous advantages. By treating the *Producer*, *Representation*, and *Resemblance Examples* as instances of semantic type shifts rather than predicate-to-predicate mappings, we avoid routing the derivation through the BCC/BNC meaning analysis, which, we saw above, is superfluous since the deferred interpretation is secured only after the contextual restriction to the individual. This is advantageous, not only because we avoid appealing to a superfluous meaning-analysis, but also to keep parity with other semantic shifts involving proper names, shifts that are markedly different from those involving common count nouns. For instance, like proper name to count noun shifts, proper name to mass noun shifts and proper name conversions to verbs are derived from the name as in AREs, not directly off of the BNC/BCC meaning analysis. Mass noun *Producer Examples* like

[65] Lenny reads too much Heidegger and not enough Frege.
[66] Let's go home and listen to some Bach.

are as natural as our count noun *Producer Examples*, and should be explained along similar lines. The type shift here is from a singular term to a mass predicate like "philosophy of Heidegger/Frege" and "music of Bach". The predicativist's deferred interpretation explanation involves the BNC/BCC and so should be treated as a count noun to mass noun shift. Yet count noun to mass noun shifts standardly involve *grinding*, which is absent here, marking another reason to doubt the alignment of proper names with count nouns. Similarly, proper name to verb shifts are also routed directly off of uses of proper names in AREs:

[67] Google professes it will do no evil.
[68] We'll need to google directions to the university.
Google → to google
[69] Robert Bork resigned his seat as appellate court judge after the Senate denied his confirmation.
[70] We're going to bork him. We're going to kill him politically… [Florynce Kennedy, speaking of Clarence Thomas]
Bork → to bork

[71]

a. Facebook → to facebook (an acquaintance)
b. Windex → to windex (the mirrors)
c. Wite-out → to whiteout (the typos)
d. Lorena Bobbitt → to bobbitt (your husband)

By contrast, verbifications from common count nouns are derived from the noun's meaning, not once it is restricted to a particular in an incomplete description:

[72]

a. shoulder → to shoulder (the blame)
b. transition → to transition (from offense to defense)
c. gift → to gift (your inheritance to charity)
d. verb → to verb (a word)

Our semantic theory should aim not only to respect but, as well, to reflect these asymmetries between proper names and common count nouns.

Additionally, by treating *BCC-friendly Examples* accounted for as instances of deferred interpretation symmetrically with *Producer, Representation, Resemblance* and *Metalinguistic Examples*, we countenance a single derivation pattern from singular terms to predicates. While predicativists can appeal to Fara's predicate-to-predicate deferred interpretation analysis for the *Producer*, *Representation*, and *Resemblance Examples*, they also need an analysis to treat names for words as they occur in argument position, as in [58], and generic names, as in [56G], as well as to account for the relationship between [58] and [57] and [56G] and [18], when it is used as a *BCC-friendly Example.*

[58] "Awesome" is quite popular these days [with almost everyone]
[57] Four "awesome"s is more than enough in one blog-post.
[56G] Stella_{G} is quite popular these days [with expectant parents].
[18] Two Stellas are in the museum.

If the predicativist treats names for words symmetrically with their treatment of ordinary proper names, then, "awesome" in [58] will be about a particular word only after contextual supplementation and [57] will have a literal meaning (to wit: entity called "awesome") that is far more difficult to access than its intended meaning regarding four occurrences of "awesome", both highly implausible. If the predicativist treats the name for a word as a singular term, we need an explanation of why ordinary proper names are not. Similarly, we need some analysis of "Stella_{G}" in [56G]. It will not do to reject Kaplan's notion of generic names, which is inessential. What is needed is an analysis of expressions the likes of which occur in baby-name books and whose referents have certain historical, social, relational, and linguistic properties. However they are construed, the predicativist needs an explanation of, say, the expression in argument position in sentences like "X lacks a Biblical origin/was more popular in 2014 than 1914/is my aunt's favorite for a girl/rhymes with "umbrella"". The same problems ensue as for names of words: construing them as falling under the BCC/BNC seems highly implausible; treating them as singular terms suggests there is reason and room to do the same for ordinary proper names. Furthermore, if such expressions are treated as singular terms, the semantic shift analysis we have offered will itself provide an explanation of the standard *BCC-friendly Examples*.

6 Family Examples

Let's return now to consider our *Family Examples*. The underlined expressions are those that are at issue.

[30] Joe Romanov is not a Romanov.
[31] Walter Cox is a Romanov.
[32] Two Smiths will be at the wedding.
[33] Mahatma Gandhi is not a Nehru-Gandhi.
[34] The Robinsons are coming to dinner.
[35] The Corleones are more dangerous than the Molinaris.

How can the predicativist explain these as somehow different-in-kind from *BCC-friendly Examples*? In contrast with the earlier set of examples, these strike most as plainly literal uses. The main question vis-à-vis our challenge to the predicativist, then, is whether the terms occur here as singular proper names. One approach, offered by Fara, is to construe the underlined expressions as here occurring as (proper) count nouns that are not proper names, expressions that, while often capitalized, are at the syntactic level simply common count nouns. She also expands our stock of *Family Example*s:

[73] I own two Les Pauls because Jimmy Page used them but not because Eric Clapton did.
[74] Les Paul, of course, only ever played Les Pauls.

taking Les Pauls, a certain variety of electric guitar, as a family of guitars.

Here again, I am sympathetic with this analysis. But now, as we saw earlier, for this analysis of the *Family Examples* to be an adequate response to our challenge, the *BCC-friendly Examples* cannot also be analyzed in the same fashion. For if they were, they too would be common count nouns undistinguished from proper names, contra premise two. Yet a plausible case can be made for construing the *BCC-friendly Examples* as literal uses of proper common count nouns.

This might seem straight off counter-intuitive. After all, when someone says

[17] Some Alfreds are crazy; some are sane.

meaning that some individuals named "Alfred" are crazy and that some such individuals are not, she is not talking about members of a *family*. But if she says

[75] Some Romanovs are crazy.

she is, intuitively, speaking about members of a family. Let's leave this concern to the side for now.

How could we establish that when "Alfreds" is used in [17] to mean that some individuals named "Alfred" are crazy, "Alfreds" is *not* occurring as a proper name? Is there a good argument or test for determining whether a candidate term is not occurring as a proper name? I suggest we seriously consider a syntactic test. The last

two lines of the Sloat chart exhibit syntactic differences between common count nouns and proper names. As revealed in the last line, [14a-b], it is syntactically correct for proper names, but not common nouns, to occur in the singular in argument position without a determiner. Thus, if a term cannot be used grammatically in the singular in argument position without a determiner, then it is not a proper name. Consider, for example,

[76] A kitten lives in Venice.

Here, the common count noun "kitten" has in its extension members of the class of young domesticated felines. Now, *keeping the semantic value of "kitten" fixed*, retaining the meaning it has in [76], consider [77*] in which the term occurs in the singular in argument position without a determiner,

[77*] Kitten lives in Venice.

In evaluating whether [77*], is grammatical, we must interpret "kitten" as having in its extension members of the class of young domesticated felines, and *not*, say, some particular individual named "Kitten". In so doing, it is readily apparent that [77*] is ungrammatical. So the occurrence of "kitten" in [76] is not a proper name.

Let's apply the test to the *Family Example*. Assume that the relevant predicative occurrences of "Romanov" in [30] and [31] are literal uses, as is the occurrence in

[78] A Romanov lives in Venice.

When used literally, these occurrences of "Romanov" have in their extension members of the dynastic Romanov family. Now consider

[79*] Romanov lives in Venice.

where "Romanov" occurs in the singular in argument position without a determiner. Keeping in mind that we must construe "Romanov" here as applying to members of the dynastic Romanov family and *not* to some individual named "Romanov", it is clear that [79*] is ungrammatical. It is ungrammatical for exactly the same reason that [77*] is ungrammatical: because common nouns cannot occur in grammatical sentences in the singular in argument position without a determiner. Notice that we do not waver in our judgment as to its grammaticality, wondering if, when "Romanov" retains the meaning it has in [78] yet is moved to argument position, an unpronounced determiner "the" suddenly becomes relevant in our understanding of the syntax of the sentence. We judge it to be ungrammatical, straightaway, and correctly. So "Romanov" in these occurrences is not a proper name.

Now, let's apply the test to a *BCC-friendly Example*, say

[80] An Alfred lives in Venice.

Assuming that the occurrence of "Alfred" in [80] is a literal use, then "Alfred" is plausibly regarded as having in its extension members of the family of Alfreds, the

family of individuals that are named "Alfred" (alternatively: whose name is based on $Alfred_G$). Now, keeping the semantic value of "Alfred" constant, let's examine for grammaticality

[81*] Alfred lives in Venice.

Here, as with [77*] and [79*], we must be careful not to shift the meaning of "Alfred". Assuming, as we must, that "Alfred" functions in [80] as having in its extension individuals that are named "Alfred", [81*] is ungrammatical, and for exactly the same reason that [77*] and [79*] are ungrammatical. As with [79*], it seems illegitimate to suppose that when "Alfred" retains the meaning it has in [80] yet is moved to argument position, an unpronounced determiner "the" becomes relevant in our understanding of the syntax of the sentence. (That is the story the predicativist has been selling us!) Of course, the predicativist *could* insist that it does—and tell the story about the unpronounced determiner. I do not deny that this is a move that could be made to block the argument. But once the comparison with *Family Examples* arises, the predicativist needs to offer some explanation why there is an unpronounced syntactically real determiner in [81*] but *not* for [79*]. It is hard to image a rationale that will not seem *ad hoc*.

What is the upshot? If the syntactic test is a good test to show that "kitten" is not a proper name, it should be a good test to show that "Romanov" is not a proper name (in the relevant predicative occurrences in [30], [31] and [78]). The predicativist agrees that in such occurrences, "Romanov" is not a proper name, and so should agree with my argument as to why "Romanov" is not a proper name (in those occurrences). I have offered exactly the same argument to show why "Alfred" as it occurs in [80] as a *BCC-friendly Example* is not a proper name. On the assumption that the test is adequate, the predicativist needs to establish why the test as applied to "Alfred" is unacceptable, while the test as applied to "kitten" and "Romanov" is.[28]

Let me speak to the worry concerning the fact that I treated the *BCC-friendly Examples* as on a par with the *Family Example* yet "Alfred", in the former, is clearly not functioning to pick out individuals who are related biologically or by kinship or marital relations. In my view, though there is an interesting question regarding what makes a particular example a member of

[28] One possible problem with the syntactic test, pressed by Barbara Abbott and Karen Lewis, is that certain terms widely recognized to be proper names cannot be used without a determiner in the singular in argument position. Consider [*] Pacific Ocean is to the west of California. Since it is intuitively ungrammatical, by the test, "Pacific Ocean" would not be a proper name. While I take the objection seriously, I am inclined to cordon off this type of example as exceptional – a point of view shared by many that have a neutral stance on this debate. One reason is that "Pacific Ocean" manifests syntactic properties that neither mirror those of ordinary count nouns nor those of ordinary proper names. For example, it does not appear to have all the syntactic properties of common count nouns, a point underscored by the problematic sentence [**] A Pacific Ocean is to the west of California. So there are reasons for regarding "Pacific Ocean" (and other similar examples: the country name, "The Netherlands", the name of the Munch painting, "The Scream", etc.) as exceptional. Cf., Segal (2001) for further discussion.

the class of *Family Examples*, and the occurrence of the term one that applies to a family, it is not implausible that the *BCC-friendly Examples* are in that class. Furthermore, the matter does not need to be decided. For the significant issue for us here is whether "Alfred", in the *BCC-friendly Examples*, can be treated as being used literally and, if so, whether it occurs as a proper name or just a common noun.

To see that the classification of the *BCC-friendly Examples* as *Family Examples* is not implausible, compare the names for dynastic families with the "Les Paul" examples [73] and [74]. While Fara regards Les Pauls as a family of guitars, it is apparent that this is an extended, broader or different notion of "family" than the one applying specifically to individuals linked by kinship and marital relations. Here, the various guitars in the extension of "Les Pauls" are related by being a certain *model* of guitar, one that was endorsed by Les Paul himself. Similar terms are those for models of vehicles, like "Mustang", which applies to certain types of cars produced by the Ford company. Proper names for companies can also occur as brand names, as in

[82] Ford is making a comeback.
[83] Should we get a Ford or a Subaru?

In [82], "Ford" occurs as a proper name for the company, while in [83] it occurs as a proper common noun that applies to cars made and sold by the Ford company. The latter is *as* plausibly regarded as a *Family Example* as are the other examples, for the items in the extension of "Ford" are grouped together as products of the Ford company.

These examples together illustrate the fact that we have various different ways of linking objects together as a family. Note that it is not essential to this class of cases that there be any attempt to unify the class of objects that fall in the family by "branding" them with a proper noun. Compare the occurrence of "Ford" in [83] with "Picassos" in

[84] Picasso, of course, often hoarded Picassos.

If the Fords count as a family, there is little reason not to count the Picassos as a family of artworks, even though there was, in the latter case, no concerted effort to unite the artworks of Picasso by intentionally so-branding them. From there, however, it is an easy step to take to regard the class of Alfreds as a family. All the individuals that are Alfreds have their name fashioned from a common generic name as if by a template in much the same way that the individual Les Pauls and Mustangs are all fashioned from a common design or prototype. So it is not implausible to regard the Alfreds as a family.

Whether we do so is, however, beside the point. What is necessary and sufficient for treating the example in the same way as we treat the *Family Examples* concerns whether the relevant occurrences of the terms are being used literally and as common nouns that are not proper names. Our result is that by taking *Family*

Examples as common count nouns, the predicativist needs to explain why the *BCC-friendly examples* should not be treated analogously for we've shown they behave in parallel.

Let's briefly discuss a different approach on *Family Examples*, due to Matushansky, who regards the relevant expressions as occurring as proper names, but not as *singular* proper names. They are taken, rather, as names of pluralities, and treated as on a par with names for certain teams, bands, troupes, mountain ranges, constellations, as in these examples [all offered in Matushansky (2014)]:

[85]

a. the Mets, the Tigers
b. the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, the Monty Pythons
c. the Alps, the Rockies
d. the Pleiades, the Hyades

By claiming that *Family Examples* involve "names of conglomerate or group entities", Matushansky aims to draw a wedge between the *Family Examples* and the *BCC-friendly examples*, because names for pluralities, she claims, cannot occur bare in the singular, in contrast with the *BCC-friendly examples*, and indeed, she claims, take certain determiners only very selectively. So our syntactic test cannot be applied. She also maintains that *Family Examples* and common nouns and names used as common nouns behave differently in generic uses. The former, she says, require a definite but the latter do not, offering the following examples to back her view.

[86]

a. The Kennedys are a big clan.
b. Picassos are expensive.

While I agree with Matushansky that the expressions in [91] are names of pluralities or a group, and there is some reason for thinking that names for some pluralities and groups take determiners selectively, many do occur bare in the singular, and, moreover, the *Family Examples* do not exhibit these behaviors. All the names for groups in

[87]

a. Real Madrid plays Barcelona tonight.
b. Nirvana/The Who/The Kronos Quartet is performing tonight.
c. Orion/Andromeda looks brilliant tonight.

occur bare and in the singular. The *Family Examples*, as shown in [30]–[35], [73], [74], [75], and [78] all take determiners freely. Furthermore, generic constructions involving family names [88a, c] seem to me to parallel those of common names [88b] and proper nouns used as common nouns [88d] and do *not* require a definite. Generic constructions with *BCC-friendly* meanings [88e] pattern analogously:

[88]

a. Corleones are dangerous.
b. Scorpions are dangerous.
c. Kennedys are wealthy.
d. Picassos are expensive.
e. Blakes get more callbacks from their resumes than Tyronnes.[29]

While there is more to say about names for groups, I conclude that the data on offer do not substantiate regarding *Family Examples* as analogous to proper names of pluralities and do not undermine regarding *Family Examples* or *BCC-friendly examples* as common count nouns.

Though I cannot argue for it here, I maintain that some but not all *BCC-friendly examples* not only can be explained as literal uses of common count nouns, but that this is a plausible analysis of them. This approach is well-suited for handling expressions like those we have been discussing so far, involving common nouns applied to individuals who have certain given names and certain surnames. The individuals in the extension of the common noun "Alfred" are just the individuals who have the common currency name "Alfred_C". For such expressions, the common noun meaning is lexicalized: when "N" occurs as a predicate, it has as one of its literal meanings "person called "N". This approach is implausible for predicative occurrences of proper names like "California", "Kristallnacht", "Watergate", "*Guernica*", and "*Anna Karenina*". Such expressions do not have a lexicalized common noun meaning "individual called "N". Even though we can create contexts in which the common noun meaning "individual called "*Anna Karenina*" is intended or salient, that should not persuade us that the meaning is itself lexicalized. In such instances, it is better explained as involving a contextually coerced semantic type shift.[30] Whether we classify a particular *BCC-friendly example* as involving a coerced semantic type shift or as a lexicalized meaning is not the most fundamental issue before us, however. After all, our two accounts are complementary and interdependent. The explanation of *BCC-friendly examples* as having lexicalized common noun meanings is dependent upon the explanation of them as coerced semantic type shifts because deferred interpretation is a mechanism

[29] This example and *Bias* in Sect. 7 are inspired by well-known social psychology experiments that identical resumes with different names receive different evaluations.

[30] Leckie (2013) advocates a *Polysemy View* according to which all proper names are referential in AREs, yet when they occur as predicates, all are common nouns and all have a lexicalized meaning "person called "N"". While I agree about referentialism, and find her arguments for the lexicalization of the common noun meaning interesting, it cannot be correct as a full theory of proper names (as opposed to a theory of anthroponyms). If "California" has a lexicalized common noun meaning (which I doubt), it is not "*person* called "California"". Bracketing this difficulty, I am doubtful that "Kristallnacht" has a lexicalized common noun meaning "individual called "Kristallnacht"" that is available (even if weak) in "There were many Kristallnachts in the twentieth century".

for generating new lexicalized meanings via the conventionalization of meaning of previous non-literal uses.[31]

7 Questioning the Ungrammaticality Judgment of [13b] of the Sloat Chart

Thus far, I have not questioned the syntactic data that predicativists have advanced. I have offered two complementary ways to explain the *BCC-friendly Examples* while preserving referentialism. One construes them as singular terms that are coerced to function as predicates. An alternative construes them simply as common count nouns.

Is the debate deadlocked, with both predicativist and referentialist agreeing about all the fundamental phenomena to be explained, agreeing on all judgments of grammaticality, and just disagreeing on their explanation? Interestingly, and crucially, no. There *must* be some difference. If *BCC-friendly Examples* can be understood as common count nouns or as singular terms coerced to function as common count nouns,[32] the expressions in these examples ought to take determiners in all the ways that common count nouns do. If, as Sloat, Matushansky, and Fara maintain, they are not common count nouns, but rather a special variety of count noun, they do *not* take determiners in all the ways that common count nouns do.

Another look at the last two lines of the Sloat chart is in order. These two lines exhibit what, according to the predicativist, are the only syntactic differences between the common count nouns "man" and parallel constructions involving "Smith".

[13a] The man stopped by.	[13b] *?The Smith stopped by.
[14a] *Man stopped by.	[14b] Smith stopped by.

While the semantic interpretation of [14b] divides predicativist and referentialist, they agree on the judgment of grammaticality. [14a] is also agreed upon by all: common count nouns cannot occur bare in the singular in argument position. The key issue, then, is, and must be the grammaticality of [13b], something that has thus far gone unexamined.[33]

[31] The dependency between deferred interpretation and lexicalized meaning is of course general, which is why certain *Producer Examples*, like "Picassos" in [84], are difficult to decisively classify as having a lexicalized common noun meaning "produced by Picasso" or as involving a contextually coerced semantic type shift.

[32] Henceforth I shall drop this alternative.

[33] Sloat (1969), Matushansky (2006), and Fara (2014), especially §§8–12, all emphasize the ungrammaticality of [13b]. In previous writings on this topic, I failed to raise any concerns about the ungrammaticality judgment on [13b] and, in fact, only noticed this crucial point in the very last stages of writing this paper. Had I noticed earlier, the paper would have taken a radically different form. Many thanks to an anonymous referee who correctly pressed the importance of [13b] to my argument in Sect. 6, and whose conviction that [13b] *is* ungrammatical pushed me to question this assumption.

Why is the ungrammaticality of [13b] fundamental for predicativism? Because the predicativist's explanation of [14b] and [13b] are contrastive. To explain away the asymmetry between the ungrammaticality of a common count noun occurring bare in the singular in argument position, [14a], and the grammaticality of a proper name occurring bare in the singular in argument position, [14b], the predicativist maintains that in [14b], the proper name is actually fronted by a covert "the", a syntactically real but unpronounced determiner. So, on such an assumption, the real syntactic form of [14b] is: [*The*] Smith stopped by. According to the predicativist, then, [14b] is actually in parallel with [13a]: The man stopped by. Of course, in [13a] the determiner is overt and in [14b] it is covert, but the two have the same underlying syntax. The predicativist regards [13b] as ungrammatical because the definite article is there overt, whereas, they maintain, in such constructions, it *must be* covert, as in [14b]. That's the contrast: for the predicativist, [14b] and [13b] cannot both be grammatical. As Fara summarizes the point, "overt 'the' cannot appear as a determiner before an unmodified name in the singular, unless it is stressed."[34]

Why is the grammaticality of [13b] important to the referentialist? If *BCC-friendly Examples* can be accounted for as common count nouns, they must combine with determiners in all the ways that such nouns do. So there *must* be a grammatical parallel to [13a].

To test for the grammaticality of [13b], let's return to our threefold comparison in Sect. 6 involving what are, I claimed, three count nouns—"kitten", "Romanov", and "Alfred", examining them this time with respect to their ability to take the unstressed definite when it is unmodified and in the singular. To facilitate discussion, I will sometimes speak of the second as a *family noun*, and the third as a *proper noun*, but these should not be interpreted as marking any syntactic difference. Compare:

[89] The kitten lives in Venice.
[90?] The Romanov lives in Venice.
[91?] The Alfred lives in Venice.

In contrast with [89], [90?] and [91?] strike us as marked, somehow off.

I maintain that both constructions are nevertheless grammatical. The explanation of why these family noun and proper noun constructions sound off has rather to do with the fact that when taken out of context, they are implicitly understood as discourse initial, and, so construed, both do involve violations of the various "givenness", "accessibility", and "activation" scales linguists have offered to explain norms on choices among referential expressions.[35] The oddity of [90?] and

[34] Fara (2014b, 21).

[35] The literature in this area is vast. See Gundel et al. (1993) for their classic six-tiered Givenness Hierarchy on which cognitive status and givenness are deemed responsible for norms on appropriateness for use of referring expressions. Ariel (2001) advances a more fine-grained approach that emphasizes instead the degree of accessibility, but is similar to that of Gundel et al. insofar as her eighteen varieties of referential choices are ranked along a single scale. Kibrik (2011) advocates a multi-dimensional cognitive approach that, unlike Gundel et al. and Ariel, stresses the importance of extending beyond a single scale for determining referential choice. I am most sympathetic with a wider approach like Kibrik's, who incorporates many of the insights of both Gundel et al. and Ariel. However, since my primary goal in this

[91?] is due to the tension created by the discourse initial use of the definite, which implies uniqueness, and the particular nouns they are combined with, both of which make salient the non-uniqueness of the entity and are atypical for speaking about a person. When understood as used in contexts in which family membership and names of persons are not salient, both sound marked. The strangeness of [91?] is compounded by the fact that by using the proper noun, the speaker makes clear that she knows her intended referent's name, but fails to use that typically preferred referential expression. To demonstrate their grammaticality, the trick will be to find contexts for which [90?] and [91?] are appropriate.

To start, consider [89], but suppose a context in which you are entirely unfamiliar with the kitten that the speaker is referring to (i.e., no particular kitten is salient, either perceptually or otherwise) and that the speaker knows this. In that context, "the" would sound off because it is here an inappropriate choice to use discourse initially. On the Gundel, et al., Givenness Hierarchy, for example, a norm on using a definite is that the speaker believe that the hearer will be able to uniquely identify its referent. When you initially considered [89], you likely did not hear it as marked because you accommodated by implicitly imagining a context in which a particular kitten *is* salient. We can explicitly build this into the case by having the speaker make salient a particular kitten by previously introducing it into the context with "kitten" preceded by an indefinite:

[92] A kitten and a dog were sleeping on a beach. The kitten lives in Venice.

Now, when you initially read [90?] and [91?], they sounded marked because it is difficult to automatically accommodate to a context in which a particular Romanov or Alfred is salient—after all, we don't have standard resources for imagining a particular person *as* a member of such a family or as having a particular name. Those are not standard, default, categories for thinking of persons in the way that thinking of a kitten *as* a kitten is, which is, in part, due to the fact that we typically can not perceptually identify an individual as being from a particular family or as having a particular name. But we can improve [90?] and [91?] by explicitly making salient a particular Romanov and a particular Alfred with indefinites:

[93] A Romanov and a Rothschild attended the party. The Romanov resides in Venice.
[94] An Alfred and an Aaron attended the party. The Alfred resides in Venice.

When the second sentences are not discourse initial, they do sound fine. They are grammatical.

One might now find the second sentence in [93] to be fine, but still think there is something off about the second sentence in [94]. There is. But it is not a reflection of ungrammaticality. By initially indicating someone with "an Alfred", you make apparent that you know the person's name and, by so using it (in the first sentence),

Footnote 35 continued
paper is only to establish the *grammaticality* of [13b] and like sentences, little turns upon the exact details in the explanation of why they sound marked in certain contexts.

you know that your hearer then also knows the person's name. This typically makes appropriate the use of the proper *name* itself, as in:

[95] An Alfred and an Aaron attended the party. Alfred resides in Venice.

Indeed, *in many contexts*, [95] would be superior to [94]. However, the grammaticality of [95] and its typically greater pragmatic appropriateness do not suggest that the second sentence in [94] is itself ungrammatical.

[95] seems superior to [94] because its second sentence employs a way of referring to Alfred that indicates the speaker's familiarity with Alfred, and that the speaker knows the hearer has familiarity with Alfred. It also employs a mode of referring to Alfred that does not make his name prominent as a *category* for individuating him, or the subject of discourse, all of which typically obtain. We presume such a canonical context when we "hear" [94], which makes it sound marked. But there are contexts in which it is natural, and perhaps even the most appropriate, to refer to an individual as, say, "the Alfred".

Consider a scenario in which A is looking over B's class roster, struck by the ethnicity distribution. B has yet to set eyes on her roster.

Jones

A: Look, you have two Yangs, two Chens, three Zhengs, and only one Jones in your logic class.

B: I wonder if the Jones is that brilliant student I had two years ago.

Here, using "the Jones" functions to both make anaphoric reference back to the Jones mentioned by A, and to indicate B's lack of certainly with respect to a recognition judgment regarding which Jones it is. This example corresponds perfectly with one involving other common count nouns.

Woman

A: Look, you have eighteen men and one woman in your logic class.

B: I wonder if the woman is that brilliant student I had two years ago.

Consider now a context in which A's clients are people she has never previously met. Her work involves simply assisting them in filling out paperwork, say, for a passport application. Sometimes they are able to execute the task themselves. B, her administrative assistant, never directly meets the clients, but files and generally keeps track of A's paperwork.

Smith

A: I have appointments today with two Johnsons and a Smith.

B: Relax…you've got an easier day than you think. Apparently, the Smith already stopped by.

A: How do you know?

B: Your inbox has paperwork from a Gregory Smith.

Here, B's use of "the Smith" serves to signal B's lack of familiarity with Smith, as does his use of "a Gregory Smith".

In another context, A is the AYSO organizer mandated with team-formation and B is a seasoned coach.

Mikaela

A: You've got a Kayla and a Mikaela on your soccer team. Good luck, coach!
B: No worries. We'll give the Mikaela a nickname. That's one of my rules—nicknames always go to the one with the longer name.

Because, in this context, Mikaela's name is as relevant to the discourse as Mikaela herself, and, it is assumed, the coach does not know her independent of the information from A, use of "the Mikaela" is entirely fitting.

Finally, we imagine a situation that takes its inspiration from the John Green novel, *An Abundance of Katherines* in which the protagonist, Colin Singleton, has a proclivity for Katherines. (See footnote 26.) Centered thematically on Colin's memory of his relationships between the third and twelfth grade (with eighteen or nineteen Katherines, depending upon how you count), the novel overflows with beguiling proper noun-containing sentences like "The thing about getting dumped generally, and getting dumped by Katherines in particular, was how utterly monotonous it was" and "Katherines appear when you start to disbelieve the world contains another Katherine".[36] No category of individuals is as activated for Colin as that of being a Katherine. The context for our next example is one in which Colin, recently dumped by the latest Katherine, is eager to find another girlfriend. Colin's close friend, Hassan, who knows him and his past very well indeed, invites Colin to attend a party, remarking "You'll *for sure* want to come". Walking in the door and wasting no time, Colin inquires:

Katherine

Colin: Where is the Katherine?

In this case, because there is a common knowledge between Colin and Hassan about the nature of Colin's attractions, the appropriateness of Colin's use of "the Katherine" does not depend upon any explicitly earlier mention of "a Katherine". Hassan has only implicated that there will be a Katherine there. Because Colin has never met her, referring to her as "the Katherine" is contextually appropriate. If, in a similar context, Hassan directed his remark to a friend with a weakness for dancers, the friend could ask "Where is the dancer?".

What are possible responses available to the predicativist? I find it difficult to imagine anyone finding fault with the judgment that these constructions are grammatical. The problem (at least for me, since I went along with the ungrammaticality judgment for a long time) is not in hearing them as grammatical once we have the right context, but rather in finding the right context for hearing them as grammatical.

Another option is to question whether, in our constructions, the definite is stressed. As an exception to their rule that "the" cannot appear overt before an

[36] Green (2006, 41, 96).

unmodified name in the singular, Sloat (1969) and Fara (2014) both note that it can if it is stressed, as in their examples:

[96] That's not THE Fabian.
[97] I just saw THE Marc Jacobs.

But this move is highly implausible. There is no reason to think that in Jones, Smith, Mikaela, and Katherine, the definite is stressed. In fact, by stressing the definite, the sentences in these cases become confusing.

A much more promising option is to try to assimilate these examples to others where there is, uncontroversially, parallism with other common count nouns. That is, predicativists might try to preserve the ungrammaticality of [13b] by maintaining that, in fact, the sentences in [94], Jones, Smith, Mikaela, and Katherine are only on the surface parallel to [13a]. They actually have an implicit restrictive modifier in them, and so are akin to [10b], and thus parallel to [10a].

[10a] The man *who is clever* stopped by.
[10b] The Smith *who is clever* stopped by.
[98] I just ran into the Zack *from my yoga class*.
[99] This is the Julia *I told you about*.

So, as candidates for B's reply in Jones, Smith, and Mikaela, and Colin's remark in Katherine, we can offer:

B: I wonder if the Jones *you just mentioned* is that brilliant student I had two years ago.
B: Apparently, the Smith *you were expecting* already stopped by.
B: No worries. We'll give the Mikaela *you just spoke of* a nickname.
Colin: Where is the Katherine *you alluded to*?

This line is certainly more promising because all of our cases involved anaphora. In the first three, the unmodified, unrestricted singular proper noun preceded by the definite is explicitly anaphoric on a prior use of an indefinite, and in the last it is anaphoric on an implicated content containing an indefinite. The success of this move will depend on many factors that I cannot go into here for it concerns whether our examples involve incomplete descriptions, whether they are to be accounted for by syntactic ellipsis, and if so, how exactly the elided content interacts with anaphora. But we should point out that any theory-neutral motivation for this move would presumably have to apply equally to corresponding sentences involving common count nouns. So B's reply in Woman would as well have to be reinterpreted, as would the case of the friend who has a thing for dancers:

B: I wonder if the woman *you just mentioned* is that brilliant student I had two years ago.
Friend: Where is the dancer *you alluded to*?

Be that as it may, there are also contexts in which there is no explicit or even implicit antecedent mention of, say, being an Alfred—examples in which the definite does not function anaphorically at all. In all the following examples, the speaker lacks the kind of familiarity with the intended referent that would merit reference with the proper name, yet the intended referent's name is sufficiently salient to make the definite combined with the proper noun a preferred mode of reference. In all these cases, the speaker comes to recognize the intended referent as having a certain name via *perception*, thereby avoiding the need for the intended referent to be introduced earlier in the discourse.

Consider the case of a young Norwegian figure skater who, upon finishing her routine, faces the judges' table which is adorned with nameplates: Erika Hanson, Jens Hanson, Arne Hanson, Erik Hagen, Jens Hagen, and Hans Jensen. Neither the skater nor her coach has any prior acquaintance with the judges. Here's the dialogue after her score goes up:

Skater-Jensen-proper noun

Coach: I think one of the Hansons must have given you that 10.
Skater: Maybe, but I think the Jensen might have done that. He was beaming at me.

Now imagine that there are no nameplates at all, but that all but one of the judges is blonde.

Skater-Brunette

Coach: I think the blonde in the red jacket must have given you that 10.
Skater: Maybe, but I think that the brunette might have done that.

In Skater-Jensen-proper noun, "the Jensen" is successful and appropriate without being anaphoric on any previous mention of "a Jensen" because there is, in the context, a select domain of salient individuals and the speaker is able to uniquely identify the judge as having a certain name perceptually—exactly analogously to the way she identifies a particular judge in Skater-Brunette. While referring to the judges by name need not be inappropriate in this context, as in this dialogue,

Skater-Jensen-name

Coach: I think either Erika Hanson or Jens Hanson or Arne Hanson must have given you that 10.
Skater: I think that Hans Jensen might have done that. He was beaming at me.

it is less economical for the coach and could be pragmatically less preferred by incorrectly suggesting greater familiarity with the judges than is merited or equal social standing with the judges within the context.[37] To be sure, part of what makes

[37] Various types of discourse initial referential choices abound even in circumstances in which the speaker and hearer are both capable of demonstratively identifying the referent and this is common knowledge between them. Some referential choices signal higher/lower/equal social standing in a

the skater's "the Jensen" pragmatically appropriate in Skater-Jensen-proper noun is that it mimics the mode of reference initiated by the coach. I.e., it *would* be odd for the skater to have begun the conversation "I think that the Jensen might have given me the 10" because there would have been no reason for her to make so salient the categorization of Jensen *as* a Jensen. By contrast, her coach did have special reason to speak of the Hansons *as* Hansons: for he was distinguishing one Hanson from among a group of Hansons.

Another example makes prominent the role of names in the mode of identification and categorization of individuals. Suppose that social psychologists are doing an experiment to discern how individuals' names color others' perceptions of them. Participants in the study are selected, they believe, to serve as independent evaluators of groups of workers in a local burger shop. Via a disguised camera, the participants observe nineteen workers who don exactly the same uniform and have very similar physical features. All wear nametags. There are three Daniels, three Andrews, three Deons, three Maliks, and one Michael. The instructions to the participants run as follows:

> Thank you for you assisting us in independently evaluating our workers here at Burger Heaven. You will observe five groups of workers. After observing them for one hour, please make comparative judgments about each groups' work habits based on (1) courteousness to customers and (2) adherence to work policy that breaks are limited to a total of ten minutes per hour. Unfortunately, two of our workers were unable to make it in today. Please write your evaluations at the bottom of this sheet.

The workers are all confederates of the researchers. All have exactly the same set routine in how they respond to customers and all take exactly nine min of break each hour.[38] After running the experiment numerous times, the researchers discover systematic bias in the evaluations made by participants, with many participants providing reports like the following:

Bias

> Report: The Andrews and the Daniels were the most courteous. The Michael took the shortest breaks. The Deons and the Maliks were less polite and some exceeded their break limit.

In this context, the researchers' confederates' names are their most obvious distinguishing feature (no different from like scenarios in which the confederates are distinguished by skin color). Given that the participants have been primed, but not told, to individuate the workers in terms of their names (they know that they are to

Footnote 37 continued
particular context; others signal the particular variety or depth of familiarity. Rules governing which referential choice is appropriate in a given situation will typically be highly culturally sensitive.

[38] In this example, nothing hinges upon the fact that the confederates might actually have names other than those given to them by the researchers. But if someone thought it mattered, tighten up the scenario to one in which the researchers actually use confederates who have the name they use in the experiment. A similar experiment could also be done on a computer-generated virtual world with physically-identical avatars that have been given names by the researchers.

comment on the *groups'* performances), use of the proper noun "The Michael" is entirely natural, especially in the context of uses of pluralized expressions, "The Andrews/Daniels/Deons/Maliks".

Finally, let's return to Colin Singleton, again at Hassan's party, only this time Hassan has told him nothing about a Katherine being at the party. However, while at the party, Colin *overhears* quite a lot, including a conversation between a Katherine and a dancer. Here's his conversation with another wallflower, also an eavesdropper:

Katherine-Eavesdropper

Eavesdropper: The dancer is so beautiful…I've got to talk to her.

Colin: Yeah, she is. But the Katherine is just, well, *compelling*.

Although, in this conversation, "the Katherine" sounds most natural following a reference with a definite to the dancer, this stems from the fact that the eavesdropper does not know about Colin's unusual attractions, and Colin knows this, so it would be the more strange in the context for him to use "the Katherine" discourse initially. Following the eavesdropper's remark, Colin's comment becomes revealing of his own curious ways of categorizing women. But we can dissolve this feature as well. If we shift to a context involving just Colin and Hassan, where there is common knowledge about Colin's Katherine fetish, it is easy to construct dialogues in which "the Katherine" occurs as normally as any other common noun, introduced discourse initially and without any anaphora, explicit or implicit. So long as he believes there is only one Katherine at the party, and that Colin is aware of this as well, Hassan can start up a conversation with Colin with either of these or like constructions:

Hassan 1, 2

Hassan 1: Did you get a chance to meet the Katherine?

Hassan 2: I bet you'll chicken out of introducing yourself to the Katherine.

Skater-Jensen, Bias-proper noun, Katherine-Eavesdropper, and Hassan1, 2 are all ordinary uses of definites, and should not be reinterpreted as involving a restrictive clause. They are no different in kind from a use of "The man stopped by" after having greeted a man at the door, and should be treated analogously. Perhaps there will prove to be other ways to defend the claim that they are different in kind from [13a]. Nevertheless, the burden of proof is now on the predicativist to either establish that the examples I have offered are somehow ungrammatical or cannot be regarded as counterparts to [13a].

If unmodified proper nouns preceded by unstressed definites are grammatical, we need to understand why exactly is it considerably more difficult to find contexts in which sentences like [13b] are appropriate and do not sound marked, in contrast with (i) the other constructions on the right side of the Sloat chart, involving proper nouns, especially others containing specific determiners; and (ii) corresponding constructions on the left side, like [13a], involving common count nouns. My discussion thus far has only hinted at an answer. Though a thorough consideration of this matter must be reserved for another time, I would conjecture that at least three

features of unmodified singular proper nouns fronted by unstressed definites together intersect to make sentences like [13b] seem so marked so as to sound ungrammatical.

First, unlike other specific determiners, unstressed definites preceding unmodified nouns lack *noun-distinguishing* and *noun-uniting* functions. In the demonstrative construction, "That Smith", like "That man", serves to refer to a particular Smith/man from among other Smith/men. It is *noun-distinguishing* because it functions to distinguish a particular individual from among others in the extension of the noun it contains. The same holds for constructions like "The Smith who is clever" and "The man who is clever" in which the noun is followed by a restrictive modifier. The restrictive modifier distinguishes one Smith/man among other Smiths/men. The same obtains for the stressed definite, as in [96] and [97], where "THE" functions to distinguish, say, the famous designer Marc Jacobs, as opposed to some other Marc Jacobs. "A Smith" and "A clever Smith" serve the same function by implicating that a certain Smith is one among others. "The Smiths", "Some Smiths" and generic uses of "Smiths" have a correlative *uniting* function: they group together several individuals who all have the property of being Smiths. Determiners that have noun-distinguishing and noun-uniting functions will naturally suggest contexts in which their use is appropriate and easy to imagine—contexts in which several Smiths are salient or their existence is implied and the speaker is isolating one out as the referent or, for the uniting function, when speaking about members of the group. But the unstressed definite preceding the unrestricted noun is different, neither distinguishing nor uniting with respect to its noun. "The Smith" and "the man" do not express, presuppose, or implicate that their referents are one among other Smiths and men. And yet, because they do presuppose that there is a contextually unique Smith and man, for uses of them to be successful and for us to easily imagine a context in which they *are* successful, the noun must serve to assist the hearer in selecting one among *other* possible referents within the context. They function rather to distinguish the Smith from those that are not Smiths, the man from those that are not men. In such situations, there is special pressure on the noun to be *apt*, for it, and it alone, is what will enable the hearer to distinguish a particular individual among others. Two of our non-anaphoric examples, Jensen-proper noun and Bias, were parasitic on the noun-uniting feature of definites coupled with plural proper nouns so as to normalize the uses of them coupled with unmodified singular proper nouns. The skater's "The Jensen" was appropriate because it was in response to the coach's "The Hansons"; the biassed report involving "The Michael" was normalized by situating it within uses of the noun uniting "The Andrews/Daniels/Deons/Maliks".

This brings us to the second feature of unmodified singular proper nouns fronted by unstressed definites: for *proper nouns* to serve such a function requires very special contexts. A condition on a successful use of a specific definite is that the speaker believes that the hearer can uniquely identify the referent *as* the individual satisfying the description. One problem with satisfying this condition when the definite is followed by singular *proper nouns* is that in many circumstances, we do not know the names of individuals because, say, Smiths and Alfreds are not typically identifiable as being Smiths and Alfreds just by inspection—unlike men

who are (ordinarily) identifiable *as* men just by inspection. So special contexts are needed to allow for the hearer's identification of individuals as bearers of their names. Of course, whenever speaker and hearer *are* on a first name basis with someone, and that is common knowledge between them, *this* problem does not impede their ability to refer to that individual as, say, "the Alfred"—for they both *can* identify Alfred as being an Alfred. However, it is precisely such circumstances that confront a different problem: reference with *proper nouns* will be trumped by reference with *proper names*. The proper name "Alfred" will be the preferred referential choice. Taken in tandem, the two problems reveal that reference with proper nouns leaves a very slim margin for contextually appropriate contexts—contexts in which the speaker believes the hearer is familiar, but not *too* familiar with the referent. Our first four examples resolved these dual problems by introducing the intended unique referent earlier in the conversation with an indefinite and having the definite function as anaphoric on it. Our second set of examples resolved it by having the names of the referents accessible via perception.

Even when the problem of securing unique reference with the proper noun is resolved, there remains an additional strangeness to reference with unmodified proper nouns fronted by unstressed definites. Independent of its role in affording unique identification of the intended referent, the noun plays an important pragmatic role in revealing the speaker's mode of conceptualizing or categorizing the referent. "The woman", "the brunette", "the philosopher" and "the dancer" may be equally successful in a particular context in getting a hearer onto a unique individual—imagine a party in which a woman sporting a chignon and leotard is observed conversing with several blonde men about her recent lecture on Kant. When various nouns will serve to enable the hearer to uniquely identify the referent, there is normally a reason why one is chosen over another. Typically, speakers choose a certain noun in order to highlight socially and psychologically revealing features of the referent, including the referent's basic kind (person, cat, etc.), gender, physical characteristics, occupation, role-in-the-context, and so on. The problem with respect to *proper nouns* in particular is that, *in most contexts*, people construe the property of, say, being a Katherine, as *trifling*: it does not reflect anything important about what makes the individual the individual she is, saying nothing about her basic kind, physical or psychological characteristics, interests, occupation, and so on. It is also unrevealing of relational properties: being a Katherine is not something that makes you more cherished or loved by others. Being a Michael or a Malik is not something that makes you more socially valued or more socially discriminated against. Such properties are typically regarded as bizarre ways to categorize individuals, and so could encourage a judgment of ungrammaticality. However, as we have seen, there do exist special contexts—those in Bias, Katherine, Katherine-eavesdropper, and Hassan 1, 2—in which they are in fact deeply revealing.

Imagine a world in which people customarily have their names tattooed on their bodies, making everyone's name perceptually available to everyone else. Imagine that in this world we are all like Colin Singleton, sexually imprinted to be attracted to those in the extension of a proper noun. In such a world, the identification of individuals' proper names would be effortless and the categorization of individuals by proper nouns would have a vital social function. The oddity of sentences with

unstressed definites fronting unmodified singular proper nouns has nothing to do with ungrammaticality but stems rather from various contingent facts about us, including about how we access individuals' names and about our social and psychological natures.

8 Conclusion

I have argued that referentialism has the resources to explain the correct data on the Sloat chart by construing APEs as, alternately, one variety of metalinguistic deferred interpretation or simply as common count nouns. The former analysis puts them on a par with other varieties of logical polysemy, which need to be explained within our fuller linguistic theory in any case. The derivation patterns parallel those employed in explaining other instances of metalinguistic deferred interpretation, and are grounded in their referential meanings. Construing them as common count nouns reduces them to a familiar syntactic category. The advantages are obvious. We need not posit a null determiner to explain AREs. We need not posit a distinctive variety of count noun that has a different distribution with determiners than common count nouns. Most crucially, we've seen that there is in fact no reason to suppose that we need to posit a special class of count nouns different from common count nouns because the alleged ungrammatical sentences are in fact grammatical.

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